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Abstract – A rise in catastrophic events as a result of poor 
safety management (e.g. the capsizing of the Herald of 
Free Enterprise and Costa Concordia), has driven the 
maritime sector to seek improvements in its safety 
management. This paper will explore the vital role of the 
human element within safety management, and why, as 
part of that safety management companies must foster a 
safety culture. The development of safety cultures is not 
new to the maritime sector. However, the increase in 
connected systems within the sector (e.g. satellite 
communications etc.) means these safety cultures must 
now consider the risks posed by digital systems. Therefore, 
the paper will consider what the core elements of a cyber 
safety culture are, and how a company can nurture its 
development. The paper will then conclude by discussing 
the various benefits of developing a robust cyber safety 
culture, including demonstrable compliance to the 
International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) cyber 
regulations, Resolution MSC.428(98). 
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Introduction 
As a result of various high-profile incidents in the 
1980’s (e.g. Chernobyl and Herald of Free 
Enterprise), there was global recognition of the need 
to develop stringent safety management systems. 
Throughout the past half century, many sectors, the 
maritime sector included, have made great strides in 
developing and enhancing their physical safety 
management systems (International Transport 
Forum, 2018). 
As a part of this movement, the integration of digital 
systems into everyday operations has helped to 
improve safety, as well as efficiency. However, this 
integration has opened organizations to a new range 
of safety risks: digital safety systems could be 
compromised leading to a safety-compromising 
incident.  
Recent terrorist events like September 11th and the 
USS Cole have raised the issue of security and the 
threat of outside influence in the maritime sector. The 
primary reaction was the introduction of the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 
2004. Recent cyber incidents affecting the maritime 
sector, most notably the 2017 NotPetya incident that 
struck shipping giant A.P Møller-Mærsk, also 
illustrated that digital technology noticeably affects 
both safety and security.  Moreover, it shows the 
importance of an effective safety culture, and 
organizational transparency when dealing with these 
types of incidences. 
An organization’s safety culture is about more than 
just addressing safety, security must now be 
considered as part of it. A robust safety culture must 
be effective and appropriate to an organizations risk 
management practices. Allowing the inclusion, and 
holistic management of, all risks facing an 
organization and its operations. 
Developing a safety culture that is considerate of any 
new risks is important, as any implemented measures 
need to be appropriate for the organizations 
operations, otherwise they will be ineffective. In a 
new digital and automation filled age, considering 
cyber security is a priority. 
Human error is, and will always be, a large 
contributor to safety incidents. As such, safety 
management practices needs to be mindful of the 
human operators. When establishing and embracing 
a robust safety culture, organizations can engage with 
the human element, and ensure they are: 
(1) Aware of the risks and how to mitigate them; 
(2) Able to make meaningful contributions to the 
safety of operations.  
To explore how, and why, organizations need to 
develop safety cultures that include cyber this paper 
will do the following. Firstly, it will explore the role 
of the human element in safety management. The 
paper will then discuss what a safety culture is, and 
ways it they can be created and maintained. The 
following section will explore the importance of 
including cyber risk management within an existing 
safety culture, and the benefits of doing so. Finally, 
the paper will conclude by discussing how, through 
engagement with emerging maritime cyber training 
platforms (e.g. Cyber-MAR), organizations can 
develop an organization-wide culture that considers 
cyber risk, operations and personnel holistically. 
Safety and the Human Element 
In 1986, a series of failures in a safety test led to the 
explosion of No.4 reactor in the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant. An investigation report, released later 
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that year, argued that human error had been a major 
contributor to the disaster (International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group, 1986). The initial response 
of both the company in charge of the power plant, and 
the Soviet Union were deemed inadequate by the 
Nuclear Energy Institute (2019). While the specific 
design of the reactor contributed to the magnitude of 
the event, the deliberate violation of safety rules 
coupled with human error were major contributors to 
the disaster (International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group, 1986). What is more, some of the policies and 
procedures that should have been in place had not 
been well articulated (World Nuclear Association, 
2021), leaving the operators to make their own 
interpretations on the best course of action. However, 
without possessing an adequate understanding of 
safety, operators were unable to make informed 
decisions. Thus, operators were negatively affected 
by the lack of a coherent safety culture/structure. 
The year following the Chernobyl disaster, the ferry 
Herald of Free Enterprise capsized shortly after 
leaving the Belgian port of Zeebrugge. In the inquiry 
report, Lord Justice Sheen commented that the 
company from top to bottom was “infected with the 
disease of sloppiness” (Deparment for Tranport, 
1987). The inquiry also noted that proper 
consideration was not given to the safety system in 
place, as much required improvement. 
These high-profile safety-related incidents helped 
lead the IMO to openly recognize the importance of 
the human element in safety. To this end, the IMO 
adopted Resolution A.596(15) which argued for 
stronger safety management practices on ships 
(International Maritime Organization, 1988). This 
work evolved over the following years, and 
culminated in the adoption of Resolution A.647(16) 
– IMO Guidelines on Management for the Safe 
Operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention 
(International Maritime Organization, 1989). These 
Guidelines paved the way for the inclusion of the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code as a 
mandatory element of the Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention (International Maritime Organization, 
2020). The adoption of the ISM Code was to ensure 
all Governments and companies took the necessary 
steps to ensure the continued safety of maritime 
personnel (International Maritime Organization, 
2014). 
As Barnett and Pekcan (2017) argue, in the maritime 
sector, there is often a complex relationship between 
safety and the human element. In Resolution A.947, 
the IMO agree that the human element is a complex 
and multi-dimensional issue that directly affects 
safety and security. Within which the human element 
involves “the entire spectrum of human activities 
performed by ships’ crews, shore-based 
management, regulatory bodies, recognized 
organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other 
relevant parties…” (International Maritime 
Organization, 2003b). 
The maritime sector has always been reliant on the 
people as operators, both on-board ships and within 
ports. As such, the human element is the center of 
effective safety management. While digital 
technology has changed the sector, and the human 
elements role has changed with it, operations are still 
reliant on people regardless of how the roles change 
(Kia, Stayan, & Ghotb, 2000). These socio-technical 
interactions are both operational, and safety, related. 
It is worth noting at this point that the IMO offers a 
distinct differentiation between safety and security. 
Safety is defined as protection from injury due to 
non-intentional events like accidents, and security is 
protection from intentional events (International 
Maritime Organization, 2020). This distinction, 
however, raises concerns when it comes to cyber 
security and the development of a cyber safety 
culture, as cyber risk management should be about 
both safety and security events. 
As argued by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the management of safety and security often 
occurs at the same time (International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 2020). As such, organizations will deal with 
the consequences of an incident in the same way, 
regardless of its initial cause. For instance, if this 
thinking were adopted into the maritime sector, the 
initial and often instinctual response of the crew will 
likely be the same to a failure of the electronic 
navigation systems, regardless whether the cause of 
the outage was a power failure, or a cyber-attack. 
Here the human element continues to be a 
fundamental part of ensuing safety and security 
through adequate cyber risk management practices. 
However, Singleton (1973) argues that the cause of 
most safety-related incidents can be traced back to 
inadequate training, instruction or attention. From 
Verizon’s (2020) recent Data Breach report, 20% of 
reported breaches were caused by human error. This 
has led to the human element sometimes being 
referred to as the biggest internal threat facing the 
cyber security of companies (Boletsis, Halvorsrud, J 
B Pickering, & Surridge, 2021; Meshkat, Miller, 
Hillsgrove, & King, 2020). Findings from BIMCO 
latest cyber security whitepaper highlights that there 
is a general perception in the sector that humans are 
the weak link in the cyber risk management chain. 
52% of respondents identified people as their 
company’s biggest cybersecurity vulnerability (IHS 
Markit, 2020). 
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As operators, the human element is often responsible 
for ensuring work-related systems remain 
operational. As highlighted by Barnett and Pekcan 
(2017) the operators of a system often form the last 
barrier within a cyber risk management system. 
Following Reason’s (1997) Swiss Cheese Model, 
cyber risk management relies on the development of 
different layers of mitigations (see     Figure 1 for 
example). These mitigations can include hardware, 
software or policies and procedures. However, like its 
namesake, these layers have weaknesses (holes) in 
them.  
The aim of an effective cyber risk management 
system is to ensure those holes do not align and the 
whole is safer than individual layers. As one layer of 
defense, it is important that the human element is able 
to make decisions that do not introduce 
vulnerabilities to the model, and mitigate the risks 
from adjacent layers. An example would be writing a 
password on a post-it note and attaching it to the 
terminal it is used to login with. Here, the technical 
mitigation is passwords, yet the human element has 
introduced a weakness by writing the password down 
for all to see. 
Table 2 illustrates how failures at the different layers 
of the Swiss Cheese Model led to the capsizing of the 
Herald of Zeeburgge. It is important to note that in 
isolation none of these failures would have led to the 
catastrophic event. However, when coupled together 
a risk penetrated the layers of mitigations allowing a 
safety incident to occur. 
Humans, as the operators or custodians of digital 
systems play a vital role in ensuring they do not 
compromise the safety of those systems. The human 
element must be aware of the safety risks during 
operations, and appropriate management practices 
ensure that a company’s safety management system 
is not eroded. 
Elements of a Cyber Safety Culture 
To understand what a cyber safety culture is, we must 
first consider the definition of a safety culture. The 
initial Chernobyl disaster report attributed many of 
the failings to the lack of a safety culture locally 
within the power plant. This led to safety being 
treated as low priority by personnel or the 
organization. Over the ensuing years, the 
organization responsible for that report, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have 
led the way in developing the definition of a safety 
culture. 
 
“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics 
and attitudes in organizations and individuals which 
establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear 
power plant safety issues receive the attention 
warranted by their significance.” International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (1991). 
 
While now dated, this was a critical point in history 
which still affects decisions today, and the definition 
given above still remains relevant today, arguing that, 
within an organization, safety should be understood 
to be, and is accepted as, the number one priority 
(International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 
1996). For safety to be seen as a high priority it 
requires the engagement with the human element. 
This engagement includes the awareness, support and 
accountability for safety on the part of all individuals 
within an organization (Corrigan, Kay, Ryan, Ward, 
& Brazil, 2019). 
The IMO, due to its engagement with the human 
element as the focal point of safety, has a long history 
 
    Figure 1. Maritime Safety Swiss Cheese Model 
 
 
Table 1. Factors Leading to the Capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise 
Failure in… 
Governance Management Technical Human Element 
Bow and stern loading 
doors were only required to 
be weathertight (a lesser 
watertightness level). 
Memorandum sent to 
operators pressuring them 
to load and leave 
Zeeburgge 15mins ahead 
of schedule. 
Lack of fool proof system to 
indicate to bridge that the 
doors have been closed. 
The Captain accelerated 
rapidly, causing water to 
flood the car deck. 
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of promoting the development of safety cultures. The 
release of IMO Resolution A.947(23), in 2003 
continues to draw the link between safety and the 
human element. As such, companies should be 
developing “a framework for understanding the 
complex system of interrelated human element 
factors, incorporating operational objectives, 
personal endurance concerns, organizational policies 
and practice… in order to facilitate the identification 
and management of risk factors in a holistic and 
systematic manner” (International Maritime 
Organization, 2003b).  
The increase in digital technology in the maritime 
sector has led to a changed relationship between the 
human element and safety. Many of these digital 
systems boast benefits like improved efficiency while 
make operations safer. However, risks arise from ill-
structured or mismanaged interactions between man 
and machine (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000).  For 
instance, human stress, and the resulting errors, can 
also be an effect of embracing technology like 
automation (Tam, Hopcraft, Crichton, & Jones, 
2021). 
Coined by Emery and Trist (1960), the term most 
used to describe these systems of interactions 
between man and machines is socio-technical 
systems. As Davis, Challenger, Jayewardene, and 
Clegg (2014) illustrates, there are six different 
elements within these systems: goals, people, 
infrastructure, technology, culture and procedures. 
Each of these elements can have an influence on 
safety. 
Baxter and Sommerville (2011) surmise that a socio-
technical system has these individual but 
interdependent technical and social parts. 
Furthermore, they argue that system performance 
relies on the joint optimization of both these parts. 
Solely focusing on one, to the exclusion of the other 
is likely to lead to poor performance and increase 
risks. Therefore, the development of a safety culture 
must consider the influence and interactions of both 
equally. For example, if operational goals are set too 
high, personnel may cut corners to ensure they are on 
target, at the detriment of safety. Conversely, if the 
technological solution is too cumbersome, personnel 
may find work-rounds that again affect safety. If 
these are developed in collaboration instances of 
deliberate violations should be reduced. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, there are multiple layers found 
within a socio-technical maritime safety system. 
Firstly, the governance layer, which represents the 
regulations and laws companies, must abide by. The 
second layer is the management layer, which is the 
internal policies and practices that govern a 
company’s specific risk profile. The third layer is the 
technical layer. This layer comprises the technical 
and often digital safety management and mitigation 
systems. The final layer within the maritime safety 
system is the human element, and as discussed this 
layer is responsible for operating within the safety 
constraints of the company. A strong safety culture 
encompasses all these layers. As such, a company 
should create safety management practices that are 
considerate of the company-specific risks, whilst 
ensuring all the layers remain aligned.  
In 2003, the United Kingdom submitted MSC.77/17 
to the IMO. This document argued that while the ISM 
Code stipulated the need to develop a safety culture, 
it did little in the way to define what this meant. The 
aforementioned document goes on to define a safety 
culture as “a culture in which there is considerable 
informed endeavor to reduce risks to the individual, 
ships and marine environment to a level that is ‘as 
low as is reasonably practicable” (International 
Maritime Organization, 2003a). 
As noted by Berg (2013), faults in organizational 
structures, like those found within the company 
responsible for operating Chernobyl, have 
contributed to various safety-related incidents. These 
behaviors are demonstrated by the two categories of 
failures outlined by Barnett and Pekcan (2017). The 
first is “active” failures, where the human element 
lack the required skills to operate safely. The second 
cause are “latent” failures, where there are ingrained 
weaknesses within the organization, possibly within 
the structure, or safety management system itself, that 
led to a safety incident occurring. Thus, to reduce risk 
to the lowest level practicable a safety culture 
requires an attitudinal change in personnel as well as 
an organizational change in its approach to safety. 
Considering the failures listed in Table 1 the active 
failure would be the crew’s unsafe operation of the 
bow doors. The latent failure would be the 
management’s insistence for early departures. 
It is important to note that within the literature there 
is often a distinction between a safety culture, a cyber 
security culture and an information security culture. 
In their detailed analysis of information security 
cultures Veiga, Astakhova, Botha, and Herslemann 
(2020) offer two clear definitions. A cybersecurity 
culture “relates to the manner in which people 
perceive cybersecurity and the resultant behavior in 
cyberspace that impacts on the protection of the 
digital information, systems and people”. Whereas an 
information security culture focuses on the way in 
which personnel processes information and how this 
has an impact on its protection.  
Individually these definitions do not cover the full 
concept of a cyber safety culture within a socio-
technical system. The cyber security culture 
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definition limits the behaviors to personnel within the 
company, and fails to address those externally aiming 
to do harm. The information security culture is 
limited to the information. From the understanding 
that safety cultures must be developed from within a 
socio-technical framework, these definitions do little 
to incorporate the multifaceted relationships between 
the various elements of a socio-technical system. 
These definitions also do not address the risks that 
operations pose to the safety of digital systems. For 
example, extreme weather, like ice or fog can have a 
detrimental impact on digital systems. These 
operational factors pose risks to safety, and have 
nothing to do with the human element, aside from the 
fact that they are expected to continue to operate 
safely when these systems are compromised. 
As discussed above, to address the complexities of 
safety management the IMO ratified the ISM Code. 
One of the primary aims of the ISM Code is to ensure 
companies develop, implement, and maintain a safety 
management system. The application of the SMS is 
to encourage the development of a safety culture 
within the company (International Maritime 
Organization, 2013). 
Remembering, that while the IMO define safety and 
security differently, they use cyber risk as an all-
inclusive term, for both safety and security related 
events. The release of Resolution MSC.428(98) 
marked this change, with the stipulation that 
company’s include cyber risk within their safety 
management practices (International Maritime 
Organization, 2017). These cyber risks must include 
both accidental and deliberate events. Whereby, 
cyber risk refers to a “measure of the extent to which 
a technology asset could be threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event, which may result in shipping-
related operational, safety or security failures…” 
(International Maritime Organization, 2021). Thus, 
companies, as part of their risk management 
processes, should be developing a safety culture that 
includes the identification, and assessment and 
mitigation of cyber threats, regardless of 
intentionality. 
Summarizing and adapting our earlier definitions, a 
cyber safety culture is a collection of characteristics 
and attributes that endeavors to reduce cyber risks to 
a level that is as low as reasonably practicable. To do 
this, organizations’ should be considering the impact 
of their internal practices and infrastructures on 
personnel behaviors. Ensuring that these elements do 
not led to situations where safety violations occur. 
Developing a Cyber Safety Culture 
In his review of Australian cyber security culture 
initiatives, Alshaikh (2020) argues that little is known 
about how organizations can develop an effective 
cyber security culture. However, in an industrial 
sector like the maritime, where safety management 
has had time to gain traction, lessons can be learnt. 
As discussed above, the human element is an inherent 
factor of risk in the maritime sector, and as such 
cannot be totally removed from operations. However, 
through methods such as good management policies, 
effective training, and the attainment of suitable 
qualifications and experience these risks can be 
reduced (Berg, 2013). Thus, the primary goal of the 
ISM Code, and the SMS, is to achieve peak safety 
performance, where there are no operational 
incidents, no personal injuries, and no harm to the 
environment. To achieve this, organizations’ must 
develop a close relationship between their safety 
culture and their SMS (American Bureau of 
Shipping, 2016). 
The preamble to the ISM Code reiterates that safety 
requires commitment from all levels of an 
organization (International Maritime Organization, 
2014). This includes the development of 
competencies, attitudes and motivations towards 
safety. However, while the ISM Code provides a 
framework for understanding safety, and the role of a 
safety culture, an effective safety culture must go 
beyond mere compliance to the ISM Code (Corrigan 
et al., 2019), and must be embedded in every 
operation. 
The development of an effective safety culture must 
often overcome several fundamental barriers within 
an organization (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). The first 
of which are information difficulties. These 
difficulties often stem from the misunderstanding of 
complex digital systems and their risks. In this sense, 
risks may be misunderstood, or go unnoticed, as they 
span numerous facets of an organization. Other 
difficulties arise from when the safety incident differs 
from the predicted event outlined in the SMS, such 
that personnel must consider actions that are not 
predetermined by the safety management system. 
These decisions must be made rapidly, and often 
without all the required information. 
The second set of difficulties that Pidgeon and 
O'Leary (2000) highlight, are organizational 
behaviors. They argue that the power dynamic 
between the regulator and regulated often undermines 
safety actions, as the regulated do not see the benefits 
of cumbersome safety processes. Furthermore, 
because of this power dynamic individuals may feel 
pressured to not report incidents or failings in the 
safety system as this could result in bad publicity for 
the organization, or punishment for operators. Hence, 
the drive for the inclusion of management in the 
development of safety management practices would 
mitigate that issue. 
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From their extensive review on safety cultures Zhang, 
Wiegmann, Thaden, Sharma, and Mitchell (2002) 
outline the following common features of a 
successful safety culture. All these commonalities 
help overcome some of the challenges facing safety 
culture development. Firstly, safety cultures are a 
concept defined at a group level i.e. at an 
Organization level. Secondly, they are developed 
through the contribution of all individuals within the 
Organization. Thirdly, once developed these safety 
cultures a relatively enduring, stable and somewhat 
adaptable to change. 
In his short introduction to safety cultures, Drouin 
(2010) outlines the core elements of development 
within a safety culture (see Figure 2). This pyramid 
highlights some key lessons on the development of a 
safety culture. 
Firstly, while there must be engagement from all 
levels of the organization, the shore-based leadership 
(as seen on the bottom of Figure 2) is the fundamental 
foundation of an organization’s safety culture. It is 
the responsibility of leaders to engage broadly with 
risk management practices, including engagement 
with outside sources of expertise to inform their 
understanding of risk. These leaders are then 
responsible for synthesizing this understanding with 
the day-to-day operational requirements of their 
organization, to ensure appropriate risk management 
practices are developed at each level (e.g. crew) 
Secondly, even those at the top of the pyramid who 
are most removed from the overall decision-making 
process, but probably more exposed to the risks, have 
responsibilities in the development of the safety 
culture. Operational personnel at this level still have 
a responsibility to engage with risk management 
practices, while also contributing to the improvement 
of those practices.  
What is interesting with Drouin’s pyramid is the 
inclusion of shipboard leaders. These individuals, 
like their shore-based counterparts, have a 
responsibility to understand the risk management 
practices. Due to the isolating nature of maritime 
operations, these leaders are also responsible, and 
expected, to make safety decisions in time critical 
situations. Moreover, they are also responsible for 
motivating and instructing the personnel they 
oversee, ensuring they are complying to risk 
management practices. 
Thus, if we apply this pyramid logic to the earlier 
model of risk management, it becomes apparent that 
each of those mitigation layers consists of their own 
layers (see Figure 3). For instance within the human 
element layer consists of a crew, a shipboard leaders 
and a shore-based leaders layer. Each of these layers 
have their own understandings of risks and their own 
responsibilities to manage risk. Therefore, the 
vulnerabilities found in the human element layer 
constitutes a combination of these sub-layers. What 
is more, each of the mitigation layers will consist of 
their own sub-layers. Making it important to 
understand how these interact and inform risk 
management practices within a safety culture. 
While the pyramid illustration does little to represent 
the communication flows within an organization, the 
placement of the risk management objectives in the 
middle does. The risk management objectives should 
be developed with the input from all levels of the 
Organization. The lessons learnt from those on the 
operational frontline should be fed into the objectives 
 
Figure 3. Safety Culture Pyramid - Adapted from 
Drouin (2010) 
 
Figure 2. Sub-Layers Within Maritime Mitigation 
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development, just as the knowledge gained by the 
leadership should also inform the development.  
While the safety culture pyramid illustrates the 
importance of organizational structure and the roles 
they have within the development of a safety culture, 
it does not address the behaviors and attitudes of 
individuals across the organization. As reiterated by 
Alshaikh (2020), the development in cybersecurity 
behaviors has a significant impact on the process 
from compliance to culture.  
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, the 
aviation sector, like the maritime sector, has been 
keenly motivated to demonstrate their commitment to 
improving operational safety and security. As such 
the US Federal Aviation Administration argue that a 
positive safety culture is built upon five behavioral 
principles: informed culture, flexible culture, 
reporting culture, learning culture and a just culture 
(Quezadra, 2016).  
An informed culture ensures personnel are 
knowledgeable about the human, technical and 
Organizational factors that determine safety. A 
flexible culture allows personnel to adapt 
Organizational process when facing certain kinds of 
risks, especially those that are unexpected. A 
reporting culture goes hand-in-hand with a just 
culture, where personnel are prepared to report their 
errors without fear of reprisal. Finally, a learning 
culture is demonstrated when people have a 
willingness and the competence to draw conclusions 
from safety information systems. 
This idea of a just culture has been recognized as an 
important attitudinal change within the maritime 
sector. The IMO (2011) argue that a just culture is 
founded on two principles: 1)  human error is 
inevitable, and, 2) everyone is accountable for their 
actions if they knowingly violate safety procedures. 
A just culture therefore should not punish people for 
genuine mistakes. With management actively 
engaging, and encouraging others to step forward, it 
allows lessons to be learnt from mistakes and 
development to occur. What is more, this managerial 
investment ensures personnel feel empowered to 
come forward, discus risk, and have an invested 
interest in the development of better risk management 
practices. 
As one of the largest Classification Societies, 
representing 18% of the world’s fleet, the American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) are key drivers in the 
development of a safety culture within the maritime 
sector (American Bureau of Shipping, 2019). To see 
these improvements organizations must identify 
areas of strength, weaknesses in defenses and 
opportunities for improvement against incidents 
(American Bureau of Shipping, 2014). As such, ABS 
have developed the core safety features they believe 
need to be present, and enhanced to ensure the 
development of an effective safety culture (see Table 
2). 
Within the maritime sector there is ongoing research 
assessing the usefulness of many tools for testing and 
nurturing a cyber safety culture. Many of these tools 
involve the use of simulated environments as a 
representation of an organization’s digital systems. 
These simulated environments allow organizations to 
develop and test their cyber risk management 
practices safely (Priyadarshini, 2018). One such tool 
is the Cyber-MAR platform, aiming to provide a 
knowledge-based tool through which companies can 
better understand their cyber risks (Cyber-MAR, 
2019). This understanding will then allow companies 
to develop and nurture cyber risk management 
 
Table 2. Core safety factors of an effective safety culture – Adapted from American Bureau of Shipping (2014) 
Safety Factor Definition 
Communication Vertical and horizontal communications channels are open and effective. 
Empowerment Individuals feel empowered to fulfil their safety requirements, which are clearly defined by 
the organisation. 
Feedback Priority is placed on the communication and response to safety issues and concerns 
Mutual Trust Individuals trust that managers do the right thing to support safety, and take on their 
responsibilities 
Problem Identification All individuals has experience and training to recognise unsafe acts and take avoidance 
measures. 
Promotion of Safety Management lead the way in promoting safety as a core value to the organisation. Not 
just seen as a for-profit exercise. 
Responsiveness Individuals are responsive to the demands of their hobs, including unexpected events and 
emergencies. 
Safety Awareness All individuals have a strong awareness of their responsibilities for their safety, safety of 
co-workers, organisation and environment. 
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practices that enhance the core safety factors as 
outlined by ABS. 
Benefits of a Cyber Safety Culture 
With the ratification of MSC.428(98), as of January 
1st 2021 a company’s SMS must now consider cyber 
risk management. The inclusion of cyber risk into the 
SMS ensures that there is a commitment its effective 
management and is not merely a ‘paper exercise’. 
Without the inclusion of cyber in the SMS there is a 
risk that in a complex organization that safety 
management becomes inconsistent, under-resourced 
and not business driven (Gordon, Perrin, & Kirwin, 
2007). Successfully developing a safety culture that 
is considerate of cyber risk will have many benefits 
to an organization.  
Firstly, a successful cyber safety culture must provide 
demonstrable understanding of cyber risk to ensure 
compliance with Resolution MSC.428(98). The US 
Coast Guard’s Work Instruction CVC-WI-027 argues 
that if under questioning crew are not able to 
demonstrate a general level of cyber risk 
management this could constitute a failure of the 
SMS, leading to detention of the ship (United States 
Coast Guard, 2020). As such, due to the hierarchical 
nature of command on-board, safety considerations 
depend upon the actions of the master and officers 
(Räisänen, 2009). The development of a cyber safety 
culture ensure that these personnel are able to make 
informed decisions about safety. Furthermore, the 
encouragement of a cyber safety culture that 
encourages the empowerment of all personnel will 
allow lower ranking crew to feel comfortable 
discussing safety practices with superiors (Drouin, 
2010). A process that actively strengthening the 
safety culture throughout the organization. 
Secondly, the development of an effective cyber 
safety culture will reduce the risk that the human 
element pose to safety, and allow employees to 
“become robust human firewalls” against cyber 
incidents (European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security, 2017). The strengthening of the 
human element will have a significant impact on 
cyber risk management across the organization. As 
illustrated by the 2017 NotPetya incident at A.P 
Møller-Mærsk, the consequences of a cyber 
incident can be non-trivial. While events of this scale 
are rare, and the likelihood of the human element 
being able to stop them is low, they illustrate that if 
personnel are prepared for these events they may 
make decisions that limit the incidents impacts. The 
incident destroyed 55,000 computers and 7,000 
servers (Ashford, 2019). Costing the company around 
$40million to recover (A.P Møller-Mærsk, 2019).  
Thirdly, the improvement of a company’s cyber 
safety culture will also help to avoid other financial 
implications like regulatory fines or reputational 
damage. If doing business within Europe, companies 
must comply with the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation. Failure to ensure adequate date security 
could lead to a hefty fine of €20million or 4% of 
global turnover. The 2018 British Airways data 
breach, that affected over 380,000 transactions (BBC, 
2018), illustrates the consequences of poor data 
protection. While the final fine was reduced because 
of the global pandemic, the initial fine was expected 
to be around £183.39million (Information 
Commissioner's Office, 2020). The negative 
publicity from these types of incidents, and their 
handling often damages a company’s reputation. 
Consequently, there can be a fall in customer or 
investor confidence, which ultimately has an impact 
on the financial stability of the company. Through the 
improvement of a cyber safety culture a company is 
more aware of the risks digital technology poses to its 
data, and its personnel are better prepared to mitigate 
those risks. A company that implements a high-level 
of cyber security, can in the event of a major incident, 
assure customers that cyber security is taken 
seriously. Thus, helping to mitigate some of the 
negative implications of the incident. 
The final benefit of a developed cyber safety culture 
that this paper explores is the reduction in insurance 
premiums. Many of the Classification Societies, who 
are responsible for ensuring ships are up to code, have 
now introduced some form of cyber notation (e.g. 
Lloyd’s Register’s CyberSAFE notation). The 
notation acts as verification that a ship, and its crews, 
are managing cyber risk adequately on-board. This 
notation can then be used as proof with insurers to 
illustrate the company are 1) compliant with current 
international regulations, 2) aware of their cyber 
risks, and 3) have adequate safeguards in place to 
mitigate those risk. This reduction in risk means they 
could be offered better insurance premiums because 
they likelihood of a cyber-incident occurring is 
reduced. Furthermore, as the US Coast Guard 
illustrates in its enforcement of MSC.428(98), being 
able to show appropriate cyber risk management 
practices also demonstrates compliance. 
Conclusion 
This paper has presented evidence that safety cultures 
are a fundamental part of maritime risk management. 
With more digital systems being integrated onto 
every ship and into very operations, crew safety is 
becoming more reliant upon those systems. It is then 
no surprise that safety cultures should now include 
cyber risks. However, as seen with other risks, it takes 
time for these cultures to develop and establish 
(Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson, 2006). This paper has 
explored various ways in which companies can 
facilitate the development of their cyber safety 
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cultures. One such platform is the CyberMAR 
project. The platform offers a sector-specific 
environment, helping companies understand their 
cyber risk management and develop their safety 
cultures. 
However, it is important to conclude that the 
development of a cyber safety culture will not make 
a company immune to all risk. A quick look at the 
news headlines will highlight that accidents still 
happen, but they are just that, accidents. Not only 
that, but the few times incidents do happen, response 
and recovery is much quicker as the organization and 
its personnel are better informed about these risks.  
The primary aim of a safety culture is to stop events, 
like the sinking of the Costa Concordia, due to 
deliberate negligence or poor decision-making from 
happening (The Guardian, 2013), and reduce the 
impacts of accidents that unfortunately do happen. 
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